This chapter argues that, beyond complementarities, there is a deeper reason why empirical indicators and existing typologies suggest a unified typology of production and welfare regimes. The argument is that a culture and social structure that lead to a liberal welfare state also lead to a liberal production system. In turn, a culture and social structure that stand behind a coordinated production system also stand behind a social democratic or conservative welfare state. In short, types of production regimes exist for the same reason as types of welfare regimes. This chapter shows this for each of the 20 countries. Before, however, I will show how this argument connects to existing approaches.
Varieties of capitalism analyses why in 'liberal market economies, firms rely more heavily on market relations ' (Hall and Soskice 2001b: 27) . Welfare state research analyses to what degree 'a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market' (EspingAndersen 1990: 21f.) . At first sight it might therefore appear puzzling why both typologies group countries in a similar way. But underlying both typologies is the question how much societies rely on market arrangements -respectively in their economy and their welfare system. This, in a nutshell, explains why we can fuse varieties of capitalism and welfare state research and why we should fuse them: each typology analyses one side of the same coin. Varieties of capitalism analyses how much societies use markets in the organization of their production; welfare state research looks at how much societies use markets in the organization of the distribution of what has been produced. Thus, the degree to which societies allow markets to govern production and distribution could explain why typologies of welfare states and production systems can be combined. Either societies allow the market to govern production and distribution, or neither. This would explain why market-based production systems come with market-based welfare states, while non-market based production systems come with nonmarket based welfare states. Several research traditions suggest that this conception, according to which common social values stand behind the welfare state and the production system, provides the potential to combine typologies of production and welfare regimes. Svallfors (2010: 245 -emphasis added) claims it is well established that '[s]upport for equality, redistribution, and state intervention is strongest in the social democratic regime, weaker in the conservative regime, and weakest in the liberal regime'. Van Kersbergen (1995: 229) argues that 'it is not so much politics or politically generated institutional settings that matter in explaining cross-national qualitative differences in welfare-state regimes, but rather it is cultural variables'. Accordingly, scholars claim that popular attitudes about what is considered fair distribution are the reason Why Welfare States Persist (Brooks and Manza 2007; also cf. 2006) . If cultural values influence welfare arrangements, they might influence the production system similarly. Notably, Goodin et al. (1999: 5) argue that societies prioritize differently the goals of assuring individual liberty, social stability and nationwide solidarity. Such priorities, which stand behind the three welfare regimes, might explain how the production system and the welfare system are organized; they might span institutional subfields. For example, Dobbin (1994: 3) argues: 'As modern industrial policies were devised, extant principles of social and political order were generalized to the economic sphere '. Becker (2007: 280) similarly mentions that 'historically evolved but contested political goals such as (more) income equality, welfare for everybody [and] participatory rights' form the basis of different varieties of capitalism. Lehmbruch (2001: 41) makes a similar argument, mentioning that economic regulation results from overarching 'hegemonic belief systems', which he understands as 'the cognitive, normative, and instrumental beliefs of elite decisions makers'. What Lehmbruch calls a 'hegemonic belief system', Peter Hall (1993: 279) calls a 'policy-paradigm', according to which policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. Like a Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the very terminology through which policymakers communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely because so much of it is taken for granted.
